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VISITATION RIGHTS FOR NATURAL
PARENTS AFTER STEPPARENT ADOPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Many children of the 1980's are stepchildren. High divorce and
remarriage rates are producing a generation of children who will
have had more than two parental figures by the time they reach ma-
jority.' The courts are frequently confronted with issues related to
the scope of the relationships between these children and their multi-
ple parental figures. One such issue arises when a stepparent peti-
tions for adoption of his stepchildren. Thus far, the Alaska courts
have consistently ruled that only a parental figure with legal parental
status has enforceable visitation rights. The interests of stepparents
and the interests of "replaced" natural parents are treated as mutu-
ally exclusive. If a natural parent refuses to consent to the steppar-
ent's adoption of his children, and the stepparent cannot prove that
the natural parent has been an inadequate parent, then the steppar-
ent remains a stranger to the children in the eyes of the law.2 If the
natural parent consents to the adoption of his children by the step-
parent or is found to have been an inadequate parent, then he loses
all rights to visit or contact his children. 3 Alaska law views parenting
as an all-or-nothing proposition.
I. In 1979, approximately 10 percent of the 66 million children under 18 years
of age in this country lived as stepchildren. Jacobson, Stepfamilies: Myths andReali-
ties, 24 Soc. WORK 202, 202 (1979).
2. If the stepparent is not allowed to adopt the children, he will stand in a
secondary position to the "replaced" natural parent if further custody determina-
tions are made necessary by the death of the custodial natural parent. See Simons v.
Smith, 229 Or. 277, 284, 366 P.2d 875, 878 (1961).
Further, the stepparent, having been denied legal custody, would have neither
the right to the children's services and earnings nor the right to make decisions
regarding the children's care, control, education, health, or religion. See, e.g., Burge
v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953)
(describing the authority of a parent with legal "care or custody").
3. One court has stated:
[A) decree of adoption severs forever every part of the parent and child
relationship; severs the child entirely from its own family tree and engrafts
it upon that of another. For all legal and practical purposes a child is the
same as dead to its parents. The parent has lost the right to ever see said
child again or to have any real knowledge of its whereabouts.
In re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 487-88, 189 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1963).
The legal effects of an adoption in Alaska are set forth in ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.23.130 (1983).
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This note discusses visitation rights for natural parents whose
children have been adopted by stepparents.4 After reviewing the
current treatment of the stepparent adoption issue in Alaska and the
common law origins of this treatment, this note explores the recent
trend toward flexibility in the legal approach to multiple-parent fam-
ily structures. The note concludes that alternatives to the all-or-
nothing approach to parenting are necessary, and that where the cir-
cumstances indicate the best interests of the children will be served
by such an arrangement, natural parents who consent to the adop-
tion of their children by the new spouse of the custodial parent
should be granted legally protected rights to visit or contact the
children.
II. BACKGROUND: CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
STEPPARENT ADOPTION DISPUTES IN ALASKA
A recent supreme court case illustrates the manner in which
stepparent adoption disputes are typically handled in Alaska. The
litigation in R.N. T v. J G.5 arose out of a fairly common factual
setting.6 R.N.T., the natural father of two children by M.I.G., was
divorced from his wife, and M.I.G. had been given custody of the
children. Following the divorce, R.N.T. maintained minimal con-
tact with the children. M.I.G. remarried, and J.R.G., M.I.G.'s sec-
ond husband, petitioned for legal adoption of his stepchildren. As
required by law,7 R.N.T. was notified of the adoption proceeding; he
responded by contesting the proposed adoption in court. Once
R.N.T. had refused consent to the adoption, the pivotal legal ques-
tion became whether the adoption could take place without R.N.T.'s
consent.8 Alaska's statutes contain provisions for adoptions without
the consent of the natural parent under special circumstances.9 In
accord with these statutes, J.R.G. attempted to demonstrate that
4. The proposal for visitation rights in this note is limited to situations in
which the prospective adoptive parent is a stepparent, the spouse of the custodial
natural parent. Visitation rights for the natural parent when the adoption is by
strangers have also been proposed, see Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Open Adoption, 21
Soc. WORK 97 (1976), but consideration of that proposal is beyond the scope of this
note.
5. 666 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1983).
6. The general facts of R.N T v.Y AG. were fairly typical of the average con-
tested stepparent adoption case, but many of the specific circumstances, such as the
fact that the natural father had been incarcerated, were atypical.
7. ALAsKA STAT. § 25.23.040 (1983).
8. AN.T, 666 P.2d at 1037.
9. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050 (1983). Statutory provisions for adoption with-
out the consent of the natural parent under special circumstances are quite common.
See Comment, A Survey of State Law Authorizing Stepparent Adoptions Without the
Noncustodial Parent's Consent, 15 AKRON L. REv. 567, 569 (1982).
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R.N.T. had, for at least one year, "failed significantly. . . to com-
municate meaningfully with"' 0 or "failed significantly. . . to pro-
vide for the care and support of"'I the children involved.
The parties stipulated that R.N.T. had not communicated with
the children for over two years prior to the filing of the adoption
petition. R.N.T. argued that this failure to communicate was justifi-
able because an incarceration and a restrictive parole arrangement
for a theft committed several years earlier had restricted his ability to
contact his children. 12
The supreme court ultimately agreed with R.N.T., finding that
his failure to communicate had not been "wilful" as required, 13 and
that his failure to support had not been "significant" as required. 14
The court reversed the adoption decree, leaving R.N.T. the legally-
recognized father of the children and J.R.G. simply the husband of
the children's mother.15
Both of the children involved in AN. T v. JR. G. consented to
the adoption by J.R.B. 16 Although the opinion of the court does not
state why R.N.T. sought to prevent his children from obtaining a
legally-recognized parental relationship with their stepfather, in
many cases the "replaced" natural parent simply does not want to
lose his right to continued contact with his children. In fact, fre-
quently the court handling these cases expressly notes that the "re-
placed" natural parent does not seek to obtain custody of the
children but only desires to prevent the adoption in order to preserve
some relationship with his children. 17
As R.N. T v. JR. G. illustrates, a stepparent who has been denied
the natural parent's consent for adoption must meet a fairly heavy
burden to succeed in his adoption petition.'8 The reason for this is
that the adoption of the stepchildren will result in the termination of
10. A.NT, 666 P.2d at 1037; ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050(a)(2)(A) (1983).
11. ARN.T, 666 P.2d at 1037; ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050(a)(2)(B) (1983).
12. kNT, 666 P.2d at 1038.
13. The court held that the parental conduct whicl causes the loss of a parent's
right to consent to adoption must be wilful, id at 1038-39, and found that the cir-
cumstances of R.N.T.'s incarceration and parole made his failure to communicate
with his children non-wilful, id at 1039.
14. The court ruled that J.R.G. had not proven R.N.T.'s failure to support to
have been "significant." Id at 1040; ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050 (1983).
15. AN T, 666 P.2d at 1040.
16. Id at 1041 (Compton, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918
(1978).
18. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.020(4)(A) (1983) (formerly § 20.15.020(2)(A)).
The Alaska Supreme Court has narrowly construed this statute which dispenses
with the need for consent from the noncustodial parent in certain situations. In re
Adoption of K.M.M., 611 P.2d 84, 88 (Alaska 1980) (Presents, letters, and cards sent
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the parental rights of the "replaced" natural parent, and the law has
never treated this termination lightly.19
At early common law, children were viewed essentially as
"chattel,"20 so that the rights of a parent to his status as a parent
were given the same degree of protection normally accorded the pos-
session of property. The protection which the older case law pro-
vided for parental rights,21 embodied in the "parental rights
doctrine," was invoked in virtually all child custody disputes involv-
ing third persons to create a strong presumption in favor of the natu-
ral parent.22 Thus, for example, in one case a natural parent was
given custody of a child even over the child's natural grandparents,
who had legally adopted the child's half-sister and with whom the
child had lived for most of the seven years following the parent's
divorce.2 3
The parental rights doctrine has been gradually eroded by the
abandonment of the concept which treated the child as property24
and by an increasing awareness of the importance of psychological, 25
on holidays by the noncustodial parent to his children are "meaningful" communi-
cations and, therefore, the need for consent from the noncustodial parent remains).
19. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the parent-child rela-
tionship is constitutionally protected. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(14th amendment right to liberty includes the right to "marry, establish a home and
bring up children"). It has held that due process requires a hearing to determine
whether the parent is unfit before parental rights can be terminated. Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). But the degree of protection afforded the parent's rights
must be balanced against other interests, and an unmarried father's parental rights
constitutionally may be terminated solely upon a "best interests of the child" stan-
dard. Quiloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
20. Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological Parents: The Courts' Response to
New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L. 545, 545 (1978-
79); see Comment, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases- Focusing on the
Child, 14 J. FAm. L. 547, 548 n.5 (1975-76).
21. Even at common law, the rights of natural parents were not absolute, and
exceptions to the requirement of parental consent to adoption developed. These
exceptions have now been codified. See supra note 9.
22. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals
for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 19 (1975).
The parental rights doctrine was reaffirmed and held applicable to third party
custody disputes in Alaska in Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975). But
the doctrine has been rejected by the Alaska Supreme Court in the context of con-
tested adoption proceedings in which the natural parent seeks to withdraw consent
to the adoption. S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1005 (Alaska 1982). For an analysis of
this case, see Casenote, Family Law: Natural Parent Preference or the Child's Best
Interests: The Court's Dilemma in S.O. v. WS., 12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 141
(1982-83).
23. Hickey v. Bell, 391 P.2d 447, 448 (Alaska 1964).
24. Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 155 (1963).
25. The concept of the "psychological parent-child relationship" involves a
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as distinguished from biological, parenting.2 6 In recent years, the
prevailing standard for determining child custody has become "the
best interests of the child."' 27 This standard lacks clear definition,
but several factors have been identified which should be considered
in applying this standard to custody determinations. The courts us-
ing this standard have considered factors ranging from the age of the
child28 to the custodial mother's adulterous relationship. 29 In
Alaska, the legislature has codified a set of factors which the courts
should consider under the "best interests" standard.30
The change in the law's perspective from a focus on the rights of
the parent to an emphasis on the rights of the child has set the stage
for the quandary which surrounds the courts dealing with contested
stepparent adoption petitions.3' At the heart of the dilemma is a
recognition that in many stepparent situations it would be in the
child's best interests to allow adoption by the stepparent, but the
right of the natural parent to parenthood also deserves protection.32
variety of personal and emotional elements. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20 (1973).
26. See generally id at 16-20 Note, supra note 24, at 156.
27. Zaharoff, Access to Children.- Towards a Model Statute for Third Parties, 15
FAM. L.Q. 165, 186-87 (1981-82).
The "best interests" standard has been adopted in Alaska to determine which
natural parent will receive custody of the children upon divorce. See Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 370 P.2d 902, 903 (Alaska 1962).
28. Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 74-75 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1048 (1978) (use of tender years presumption rejected).
29. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 566 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Alaska 1977), aff'd on rehearing
on other grounds, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
30. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (1983) lists six sets of factors to be considered:
1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of a child; 2) the capa-
bility and desire of each parent to meet these needs; 3) the child's preference, if the
child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference; 4) the love and affection
existing between the child and each parent; 5) the length of time the child has lived
in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
and 6) the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent
relationship between the child and the other parent. This statute is supplemented by
ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (1983), which states that "[i]n determining the best inter-
ests of the child [in custody disputes,] the court shall consider all relevant factors
including those factors enumerated in ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)."
31. The quandary created by the tension between the rights of natural parents
and the best interests of children also envelops courts dealing with conflicts analo-
gous to contested stepparent adoptions - for example, when the prospective adop-
tive parents are foster parents.
32. There may be a constitutional mandate that the rights of fit natural parents
be preserved. The United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide
whether it is constitutionally permissible for a state to order an adoption in the
absence of a determination that the parent whose rights are being terminated is
unfit. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16 (1979).
This view is in accord with the protection the Court appeared to grant parental
1984]
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Most courts confronting this dilemma have felt constrained to stay
within the current system which prohibits contested stepparent adop-
tion unless the natural parent is proven unfit.
III. RECENT FLEXIBILITY IN MULTIPLE-PARENT SITUATIONS
In response to the tension between the rights of the natural par-
ent and the best interests of the children, legal decisionmakers have
recently made some inroads into the traditional approach to multi-
ple-parent conflicts. Legislatures and courts are beginning to recog-
nize that non-exclusive parenthood can be an appropriate resolution
of some multiple-parent disputes. Visitation rights are now being
granted to persons who concededly have neither a legal obligation to
care for the children nor any authority to control them. Courts and
legislatures have demonstrated this new flexibility in two areas:
grandparent visitation and "open" psychological parent adoption.
A. Grandparent Visitation
Within the past twenty years, a majority of states33 have enacted
statutes that provide grandparents of children whose parents are
divorced or deceased34 with the right to petition for visitation
rights in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972), which was later limited some-
what by Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1211.1 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West 1982), id § 4601
(West 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-116 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-56 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.13(2)(c), 68.08 (West Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 32-1008 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , § 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2 (Bums Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West
1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (Supp. 1982), id § 60-1616 (1983); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1983); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 157 (West Supp.
1984); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.400, 452.402 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-4-217, 40-9-102 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-9-1 to -4 (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2, 50-13.50) (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1
(Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 60.16(3) (West Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, §§ 1012-1015 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.1 to .2 (1981 &
Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1101 to -1102 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (Vernon
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1
(1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(4) (West 1981).
34. The divorce or death of a natural parent is not always a prerequisite for
grandparents to receive visitation rights. See IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983) (district
court may grant reasonable visitation to any grandparent who has established a
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privileges. The enactment of these "grandparent visitation statutes"
represents a significant departure from the traditional legal notions
of the structure of the family. In earlier times, grandparents were
seen as having no legal duties or obligations toward the children
and, therefore, were thought to be entitled to no legally recognized
privileges. 35 In particular, no legally enforceable right of visitation
was recognized. 36 Fit natural parents generally were considered to
be the sole guardians of the children's best interests and had com-
plete authority to determine who would have access to the
children.37
Existing grandparent visitation statutes vary greatly in the cate-
gories of persons granted rights,38 and the courts differ widely on the
question of how a subsequent adoption affects the grandparents' visi-
tation rights.39 The widespread enactment of these statutes, how-
ever, indicates a new willingness by lawmakers to confer visitation
privileges upon persons who do not possess a traditional legal rela-
tionship to the children. Visitation is granted because it is seen as
substantial relationship with the minor child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1982) (visitation rights may be granted when child resided with grandparent for 12
months or more); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977) (grandparent may
apply for habeas corpus where conditions exist in which equity would see fit to
intervene).
35. See, e.g., Succession of Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, 352, 15 So. 151, 152 (1894).
36. Id
37. See, e.g., Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947); Common-
wealth ex relDogole v. Cherry, 196 Pa. Super. 46, 173 A.2d 650 (1961). Grandpar-
ents seeking visitation privileges were frequently held not to have standing to
receive judicial review of their request for visitation rights. See, e.g., Succession of
Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, 15 So. 151. But cf. Commonwealth ex refWilliams v. Miller,
254 Pa. Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1978) (granting visitation rights without a statute).
See generally Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23
ST. Louis U.L.J. 643 (1979).
38. Some of the grandparent visitation statutes expressly include third persons
who are not grandparents within their scope. Alaska's statute, for example, provides
for possible visitation by "a grandparent or other person." ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150 (1983).
39. Some courts have held that the visitation rights granted to grandparents are
superseded by the rights of adoptive parents to exclusive control over access to the
children and that the visitation rights terminate automatically upon adoption. See,
e.g., Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974); Smith v. Trosclair,
303 So. 2d 926 (La. Ct. App. 1974), aftd, 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975); People ex rel
Levine v. Rado, 54 Misc. 2d 843, 283 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Deweese v.
Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). Other courts and legislatures
have differentiated between adoption by relatives and stepparents and adoption by
strangers and have permitted continuation of visitation rights in the former situta-
tion. See Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975); Graziano v. David, 50
Ohio App. 2d 83, 90-91, 361 N.E.2d 525, 530 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5(c)
(West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(3) (West 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 60.16 (West Supp. 1982).
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being in the best interests of the children,40 and although the objec-
tions of the parents still are considered, they are relevant only as one
factor in determining the child's "best interests" and not as a control-
ling factor to preclude visitation.41
It may seem that enactment of grandparent visitation statutes,
particularly those which explicitly include non-grandparent third
persons,42 are a legislative fiat to recognize the visitation rights of
"replaced" natural parents. But two aspects of the grandparent visi-
tation statutes indicate that these statutes will not suffice to confer
visitation rights upon "replaced" natural parents. First, the statutes
have been justified by reliance upon a presumption that grandpar-
ents play a very different role from parents and that the role of
grandparent does not interfere with parental authority.43 Second,
most of these statutes are predicated upon the death or divorce of the
natural parents,44 and some courts have held that the rights of the
grandparents terminate upon adoption by a new parent.45 Thus,
grandparent visitation statutes cannot be relied upon to extend visi-
tation rights to the stepparent adoption context, where a direct role
conflict might be created between the "replaced" natural parent and
the stepparent.
B. "Open" 46 Psychological Parent 47 Adoption
The second major area of family law in which new flexibility in
the legal approach to multiple-parent conflicts has been demon-
strated is the situation in which the natural parent seeks to regain
custody of his children from persons with whom the children have
formed psychological parent-child relationships. These "psychologi-
cal parents" are typically either foster parents or third persons volun-
tarily entrusted with long-term care of the children by the natural
40. Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best
Interests of the Child, 26 CATE. U.L. REv. 387, 392 (1976).
41. Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objection of a Parent" The
Best Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 51, 54-57 (1976-77).
42. See supra note 38.
43. Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 436, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975).
44. But see statutes cited supra note 34.
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. The term "open" is borrowed from a thoughtful article on adoption by
strangers, which defined an "open adoption" as "one in which the birth parents
meet the adoptive parents, participate in the separation and placement process,
relinquish all legal, moral and nurturing rights to the child, but retain the right to
continuing contact and to knowledge of the child's whereabouts and welfare."
Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Open Adoption, 21 Soc. WORK 97, 97 (1976). In this
note, the term "open" includes visitation rights, as the authors creating the term
intended. See id at 99.
47. See supra note 25.
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parent.4 8 Some courts have recently indicated a willingness to vest
legal custody in the psychological parents and to grant the natural
parent visitation rights.49
The instances in which courts have resolved multiple-parent
custody disputes by allowing adoption by the psychological parents
with visitation for the natural parents are still relatively rare. The
"open" adoption resolution is a radical departure from the prior le-
gal approach, particularly where the psychological parents are foster
parents.50 Nevertheless, in keeping with the substantial degree of
discretion which trial courts always have had in undertaking custody
determinations, 51 granting custody to the psychological parents with
visitation for the natural parent has been upheld when the adoption
has been found to be in the best interests of the children.5 2 The visi-
tation allowance protects the right of the natural parent to play a role
in the children's lives.
The circumstances of the psychological parent adoption cases
which have led the courts to grant "open" psychological parent
adoptions are closely analogous to the circumstances of many con-
tested stepparent adoption cases. Stepparents who petition for adop-
tion frequently are already functioning as psychological parents, and
often it would be in the children's best interests to grant legal paren-
tal status to the stepparent. On the other hand, as in the open psy-
chological parent adoption situation, the natural parent is not "unfit"
and a complete termination of that parental relationship would vio-
late the legal tradition of protecting the natural parent's rights. Ex-
tending the reasoning and resolution of the open psychological
parent adoption situation to the stepparent adoption situation should
be easy: allow both stepparent adoption and continued natural par-
ent visitation. The rarity of open psychological parent adoptions,
48. Compare D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1236-38 (Alaska 1973) (nine-year-old
child had been cared for by foster parents for eight years, court found parent had
abandoned child) with Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1052, 1055 (Alaska 1975)
(natural mother had originally entrusted child to the care of the child's aunt, court
held no abandonment by parent).
49. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977); Bennett v. Marrow, 59
A.D.2d 492, 399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1977); Reflow v. Reflow, 24 Or. App. 365, 545 P.2d
894 (1976).
50. The role of "foster parent" is intended to be temporary, and the legal system
has historically resisted efforts to facilitate the attainment of permanent parental
status for foster parents. See Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adop-
tion Law and Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 34-39 (1975);
Derdeyn, Rogoff & Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights
After Long-Term Foster Care, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1165, 1166-71 (1978); Katz, Legal
Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 290-301 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Horton v. Horton, 519 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Alaska 1974).
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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however, makes these cases weak precedent, and the factual context
of the psychological parent cases differs from the stepparent context
in significant ways. Most importantly, courts may be less willing to
cut off the "replaced" natural parent's status as a legal parent when
the separation from the children results from divorce rather than
from the placement of the children in the care of third persons.
IV. PROPOSAL: FLEXIBILITY IN CASES INVOLVING THE
VISITATION RIGHTS OF REPLACED NATURAL PARENTS
While lawmakers have taken some steps toward a less rigid view
of parental roles and visitation privileges, these steps have been ten-
tative and limited to the precise factual settings which gave rise to
them. Greater flexibility in the legal approach to multiple-parent
conflict over stepparent adoptions is necessary. An inflexible ap-
proach to parental rights in these situations is outdated and unrealis-
tic. In many stepparent adoption disputes, the interests of the
stepparent and those of the "replaced" natural parent are not mutu-
ally exclusive, contrary to the view of the law. The stepparent seeks
to legalize his relationship to the children, and the natural parent
wishes to retain a legally protected right to involvement with the
children. In order to serve the best interests of the children, the law
should recognize that upon the remarriage of the custodial parent,
the children have more than two parental figures. The "replaced"
natural parent does not disappear from the children's world,53 but
neither does he hold the same position in the children's lives as he
did before the divorce and remarriage. The natural parent still holds
an important biological, sociological, and psychological connection
with the children,54 but it is the stepparent who lives with the chil-
dren and presumably has significant input into the day-to-day deci-
sions about the children's lives. The law should acknowledge this
important shift in parental roles. Parenthood is, at times, appropri-
ately non-exclusive.55
53. Psychologists report that children often fantasize about and become ob-
sessed with the noncustodial parent. Benedek & Benedek, Posidivorce Visitation.- A
Child's Right, 16 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 256, 261 (1977); Wallerstein &
Kelly, Effects of Divorce on the Visiting Father- Child Relationsho, 137 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 1534, 1536 (1980).
54. Psychological evidence demonstrates that the maintenance of a relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent is critically important to the psycho-
logical adjustment of the child after the divorce. See, e.g., Hess & Camara, Post-
Divorce Family Relationshps as Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorcefor
Children, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 79, 92-94 (1979); Wallerstein & Kelly, Children and Di-
vorce.A Review, 24 Soc. WORK 468, 471 (1979).
55. In one of the most frequently cited sources in the family law area, three
experts argued that, in order to protect the relationship between the child and the
custodial parent, the custodial parent should determine the visitation rights of the
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The wisdom of providing visitation rights to natural parents af-
ter adoption by stepparents already has been recognized by a few
courts, primarily where "extraordinary circumstances" are found to
exist.56 In these cases, the court has determined that the facts of the
case indicate a special desirability for continued contact between the
child and the "replaced" natural parent. Usually, the "extraordinary
circumstances" are cultural aspects of the child's background, 57 typ-
ically a mixed racial heritage, which may be ignored or lost if the
"replaced" parent is not allowed to maintain contact with the child.
In In re Adoption of Children by F,58 a New Jersey court granted
the natural parent visitation rights in the context of a stepparent
adoption without reliance upon a finding of "extraordinary circum-
stances." The case involved a petition for adoption by the stepfa-
ther, F, of two girls, ages 11 and 9, and an answer to that petition by
the natural father, 0, conditionally consenting to the adoption. The
condition imposed on the consent was that the court grant the chil-
dren an independent, enforceable right to visit their natural father.59
In an interview by the court both girls expressed a desire to be
adopted by their stepfather but also indicated that they would like
the court to permit them to continue to visit their natural father. The
court, in granting both the adoption and the visitation privilege, re-
lied upon earlier state cases which liberally construed the adoption
statutes in order to protect the rights of all affected parties and upon
noncustodial parent. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 25, at 38.
This position has been disputed by other experts in the field of child psychology, see
Benedek & Benedek, supra note 53, at 263; Friedman, The Father's Parenting Expe-
rience in Divorce, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1177, 1181 (1980), and has been rejected
by certain courts, see e.g., Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 623, 363 N.Y.S.2d
403, 412 (Fain. Ct. 1974).
56. See, e.g., In reS., [1975] 1 All E.R. 109 (C.A.) (child of mixed racial origin);
In re J., [1973] 2 All E.R. 410 (Fain.) (child of Jewish father).
57. The "extraordinary circumstances" relied upon by the courts in allowing
continued visitation by the noncustodial natural parent after adoption by the step-
parent are not always cultural. See, e.g., In re Adoption of N., 78 Misc. 2d 105, 355
N.Y.S.2d 956 (Surr. Ct. 1974) (extraordinary circumstances included finding of nat-
ural father's parental fitness, despite his technical "abandonment" of child, and cus-
todial mother and stepfather's willingness to allow visitation by natural father).
58. 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
59. Id at 421, 406 A.2d at 987. Granting the right to visitation to the children
themselves is an acceptable resolution only in a very limited number of instances.
Where the children are so young as to be easily manipulated, or where the "re-
placed" natural parent would fear such manipulation, vesting the right to control
visitation in the children is unworkable. Further, even in circumstances where there
is little possibility of manipulation by the custodial parent, vesting the child with
complete control over visitation by the "replaced" natural parent creates a situation
ripe with potentially severe loyalty conflicts for the child.
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recently revised adoption laws requiring liberal construction of the
statutes for the best interests of the children.60
Granting stepparent adoption while maintaining visitation
rights for the natural parent can serve the children's best interests
and also provide a measure of protection for the natural parent's
right to continued contact with the children. In situations where the
natural parent's role as legal parent would best be carried out by the
stepparent (for example, where the natural parent could not make
well-informed health care or disciplinary decisions because he or she
lives far from the children or visits infrequently), allowing adoption
by the stepparent and establishing protected visitation privileges for
the natural parent will best serve the interests of all concerned
parties.
Consent to stepparent adoption will be more readily attained
when the "replaced" natural parent does not, by consenting, forfeit
all right to involvement with the children. More stepparents will be-
come legal parents and many lengthy, difficult, and damaging court-
room battles will be avoided. The children will benefit from a
legally stable relationship with the stepparent without the loss of all
contact with the "replaced" natural parent. The "replaced" natural
parent will attain permanent rights to visit his children but wil no
longer have either legal responsibility for the children or any obliga-
tion to support them.6'
The resolution reached in In Re Adoption by Fis not only satis-
factory in its ultimate outcome, the adoption granted and visitation
rights provided, but the case is exemplary in the manner in which
this result was reached. The division of parental roles was not im-
posed upon the parties at the instigation of the court; it was a resolu-
tion reached by the parties themselves. A conditional consent
answer was an ideal way for this resolution to be achieved. When
the natural father submitted the conditional consent answer, he es-
sentially agreed to have his parental role shifted to that of visiting
parent.
There is no mention in the case of the stepfather's reaction to
60. Id at 424, 406 A.2d at 988. The New Jersey statute relied upon by the court
states: "This act shall be liberally construed to the end that the best interests of
children be promoted. Due regard shall be given to the rights of all persons affected
by an adoption." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West Supp. 1984).
61. In addition, it is likely that conflicts between the parents will fade as new
permanent parental roles are established. A surprising additional benefit to the cus-
todial parent and stepparent may evolve from moderately frequent contact with the
"replaced" natural parent; one study indicates greater marital quality exists between
divorced-remarried persons who had moderate levels of contact with the former
spouse than between divorced-remarrieds who had low or high levels of such con-
tact. See Clingempeel, Quasi-kin Relationshios and Marital Quality in Stepfather
Families, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 890 (1981).
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the conditional consent answer, but it seems probable that most step-
parents in similar situations would agree to the condition. If the
stepparent in these cases opposes the visitation privileges as a condi-
tion to adoption, then the proceeding should be carried out in the
manner in which it is currently treated - the court would determine
whether the legal parental status of the natural parent should be ter-
minated because the natural parent is "unfit." Given the high stan-
dard of proof which the courts typically require of the stepparent in
contested adoption proceedings, the stepparent usually will not pre-
vail on his petition. If the adoptive stepparent agrees to the arrange-
ment suggested by the natural parent, then the court should
independently review the proposal from the perspective of guarding
the best interests of the children. An independent review of each
case is necessary to ensure that such an arrangement will be in the
children's best interests, since this sort of arrangement is not appro-
priate in all situations.62
The determination whether stepparent adoption with continued
visitation would be in the children's best interests depends upon the
specific facts of each case and should not be made mechanistically.
As a preliminary matter, the court should recognize that the pro-
posed multiple-parent arrangement will not be appropriate in all
cases. In some instances, it will be in the children's best interests to
grant the adoption in the traditional way, cutting off completely the
"replaced" natural parent's right of access to the children. In other
instances, it will be in the children's best interests to preserve the
"replaced" natural parent's status as legal parent and to deny adop-
tion by the stepparent. The primary goal of the court in resolving
each stepparent adoption dispute should be to serve the children's
best interests.
There are two separate threshold questions which the court
should resolve before granting a petition for stepparent adoption
with natural parent visitation. The court must determine if adoption
62. Studies on joint custody arrangements support the intuitive belief that not
all parents and children are capable of handling multiple-parent arrangements. See
Steinman, Joint Custody. What We Know, What We Have Yet To Learn, and the
Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L. Rav. 739, 745-49 (1983) (the abil-
ity of the parents to separate their roles and feelings as spouses from those as parents
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of joint custody arrange-
ments). See generally Kelly, Further Observations on Joint Custody, 16 U.C.D. L.
Rav. 762, 765 (1983) (joint custody may be superior to sole custody for many fami-
lies); Nestor, Developing Cooperation Between Hostile Parents at Divorce, 16
U.C.D.L. REv. 771, 775 (1983) (parents with the potential for successful joint cus-
tody arrangements should be led into the requisite sharing gradually); Reece, Joint
Custody: A Cautious View, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 775, 777-78 (1983) (additional re-




by the stepparent would be beneficial for the children. Indepen-
dently, the court must also determine if continued visitation by the
"replaced" natural parent would be beneficial 63 for the children. The
court should allow the proposed arrangement only if it finds that
both adoption by the stepparent and visitation by the "replaced"
natural parent are beneficial for the children. 64
There are several factors which the court should consider in an-
swering each of the suggested threshold questions. In determining
whether adoption by the stepparent would be beneficial for the chil-
dren, the court should consider the relationship between the children
and the stepparent, the existence of siblings in the care of the step-
parent, the length of time the stepparent has invested in the parental
relationship, the emotional stability of the stepparent, any history of
physical violence or of spousal or child abuse on the part of the step-
parent, the ability of the stepparent to meet the children's basic fi-
nancial needs, and the willingness and ability of the stepparent to
cooperate in a multiple-parent arrangement. In determining
whether continued visitation by the "replaced" natural parent would
be beneficial for the children, the court should consider the quality
of the relationship between the children and the "replaced" natural
parent, the existence of siblings in the care of the "replaced" natural
parent, the frequency and quality of the "replaced" natural parent's
visits in the past, the emotional stability of the "replaced" natural
parent, any history of physical violence or of spousal or child abuse
on the part of the "replaced" natural parent, and the willingness and
ability of the "replaced" natural parent to cooperate in a mulitiple-
parent arrangement. Additionally, on both questions, the wishes of
the children who are old enough to have an opinion should be con-
sidered. The weight to be given each of these factors depends upon
the specific facts of each case. No one factor should be controlling.
63. The term "beneficial" in this note could also be called "non-detrimental"
since a rebuttable presumption should exist that visitation with the replaced natural
parent is in the children's best interest. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.






adoption beneficial adoption not beneficial
Allow adoption with No adoption.
continued visitation.
Visitation continues.
Allow adoption. No adoption.
No visitation. No visitation.
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The alternative of non-exclusive parenthood should not be con-
fined to those situations in which the parties themselves suggest it.65
The court should inquire into the acceptability of this arrangement 66
whenever a petition for adoption of stepchildren is contested by the
noncustodial natural parent. If the arrangement already has been
considered by the parties but was rejected by one or both, the court
should take the reasons for this rejection into account in its final de-
cision.67 The courts should hesitate68 to use this remedy against the
wishes of both parties.69 As a practical matter, the multiple-parent
concept may not work to the children's benefit unless the parties
have acquiesced to the arrangement.70
65. Even the most vocal opponents of court-ordered visitation by the noncus-
todial parent must concede that continued visitation by the "replaced" natural par-
ent after stepparent adoption is at least no more an abrogation of the custodial
parent's authority than the current system, under which the natural parent usually
does retain visitation rights even against the custodial parent's wishes.
66. Since the judge will ultimately decide whether adoption with continued visi-
tation is an appropriate resolution, the involvement of the judge at the stage of pro-
posing resolutions may raise some of the same concerns as are raised by judicial
involvement in settlements. For a general discussion of these concerns, see Oesterle,
Dangers of Judge-Imposed Settlements, 9 A.B.A. J. LITIG. 29 (Spring 1983).
67. Two factors which the court might consider in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the objections each party has to the arrangement are the length (or brevity)
of the present marriage of the custodial parent and the number of marriages of the
custodial parent. The court's consideration of the reasonableness of the parties' ob-
jections appears to be authorized by statutes which permit courts to issue orders
terminating parental relationships in connection with adoption proceedings on the
grounds that the parent is unreasonably withholding consent to the adoption.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (1983). But ef. B.J.B.A. v. M.J.B., 620 P.2d 652, 655
(Alaska 1980) (provision governing relinquishment of parental rights not applicable
to a consent to adoption).
68. There may be constitutional limits upon the courts' ability to terminate the
parental status of persons who have not been found to be unfit. See supra note 32.
69. The children are not considered "parties" but should be heard in the matter.
The consent of children who are old enough to form an opinion should be a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition to order an adoption with visitation rights for the
natural parent. Alaska currently requires consent of a minor who is sought to be
adopted if the child is over 10 years of age, unless the court dispenses with the
minor's consent in the minor's best interests. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.040(a)(5)
(1983).
70. The fact that the parties do not initially assent to visitation should not end
the inquiry. Psychologists have suggested that visitation ordered by the courts may
provide the extra pressure needed to resolve parental conflicts over shared custody
and visitation. See, e.g., Benedek & Benedek, supra note 53, at 263.
A refusal by either the "replaced" natural parent or the stepparent to cooperate
in the proposed arrangement should not bar consideration of this proposal. Step-
parents who refuse to assent to continued visitation by the "replaced" natural parent
after adoption should be required to prove that the "replaced" natural parent is
unfit. See supra p. 331. "Replaced" natural parents who refuse to assent to the
adoption by the stepparent even when the court has determined that stepparent
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VI. CONCLUSION
A more flexible approach to stepparent adoption would be
fairly easy to implement in Alaska. The Alaska legislature, by its
enactment of a grandparent visitation statute,71 has demonstrated a
willingness to adopt a more flexible legal approach to family struc-
tures where the best interests of the children are served by such flexi-
bility. The legislature should encourage the courts confronted with
contested stepparent adoption cases to consider granting adoption
with continued visitation by the noncustodial natural parent. Enact-
ment of a provision in the adoption laws indicating legislative ap-
proval of this type of resolution would increase the probability of the
courts' implementation of the more flexible approach. 72
The Alaska courts have demonstrated a modem approach to
other family law issues, 73 and have staunchly protected the rights of
natural parents to their legal parental status.74 The Alaska courts
should find the proposal for recognition of non-exclusive parenthood
appealing. Recognizing a second parental role for the "replaced"
natural parent will safeguard the natural parent's right to contact
with his children and also will serve the children's best interests.7 5 A
more flexible legal approach to multiple parent conflicts ultimately
will serve to further the best interests of the entire family.
Bea Witzleben
adoption would be in the children's best interests and continued visitation would be
allowed should have their legal parental status terminated.
71. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983).
72. The statutory provision could be a fairly open-ended one and could include
a provision similar to the New Jersey statute discussed supra note 60.
73. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has rejected the "doctrine of tender
years" which created a presumption that the custody of young children should be
given to the mother. Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 74-75 (Alaska 1977), cerl.
denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975) (non-parent
must show that it clearly would be detrimental to the child to permit natural parent
to have custody). But Sf S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1005 (Alaska 1982) (no parental
preference where natural parent initially consented to adoption).
75. The issue whether the courts have the authority to grant visitation rights and
adoption petitions in the same proceeding has not been reached by Alaska courts.
Several courts confronting this issue have held that the courts do have the inherent
authority to grant this type of relief. See, e.g., Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174,
372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977); InreL., 53 A.D.2d 669, 670, 385 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (1976);
In re Adoption of N., 78 Misc. 2d 105, 109, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956, 961-62 (Surr. Ct.
1974).
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